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I.

Introduction

It is increasingly common for secured
creditors to demand that workout agreements
include provisions in which the debtor waives
or agrees to modify bankruptcy protections. The
judicial response to these provisions has been varied. This article discusses the enforceability of
bankruptcy-related waiver provisions and the
practical considerations in negotiating and drafting these provisions for pre-bankruptcy workout agreements. While the emphasis of this article is on agreements for relief from the automatic stay in contemplation of a later bankruptcy
case, this article will also discuss waiver of other
types of rights and the enforceability in a subsequent bankruptcy case of stipulations entered into
in an earlier bankruptcy case.
II.

Typical scenario

not succeed in solving its problems in the negotiated time period, the debtor will cooperate with
the secured creditor by acceding to a foreclosure
on the collateral or perhaps even by delivering a
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.
The secured creditor and its counsel,
knowing that an agreement not tofile bankruptcy
is not enforceable as a matter of public policy,'
may consider whether they can protect the secured creditor's position if the debtor does file
bankruptcy by having the debtor waive the protection of the automatic stay.2 Indeed, the debtor
may be desperate to obtain concessions from the
secured creditor and may be induced to promise
anything in return. Counsel for the debtor should
normally advise the debtor to refuse to agree to
such a waiver. Counsel for both the secured creditor and the debtor should consider whether the
waiver is enforceable and what other ramifications may follow from having a waiver in a prebankruptcy agreement. Both parties need to anticipate the positions that may be taken in negotiations. Will the other side really insist on its
position to the end? Is it really nonnegotiable?
How insistent should each side be?
While waiver provisions are most often
seen in the context of a defaulted real estate loan,
they are also occurring in the context of other
types of commercial loans. Additionally, those
provisions now address a broader range of bankruptcy concerns, such as the validity and enforceability of the creditor's claims, the waiver of affirmative claims of the debtor, the use of cash
collateral, cramdown in the context of a plan of
reorganization and dischargeability of debts.

Typically, negotiations over bankruptcy
waiver provisions occur between a debtor in default and a secured creditor who is entitled to
exercise its right to foreclose on collateral or otherwise terminate the lending relationship. The
debtor is hopeful that with the additional time,
and perhaps given other concessions, it will be
able to resolve its problems without filing a bankruptcy case. The secured creditor may be willing to delay exercising its rights and to grant
concessions, believing this approach is preferable to a bankruptcy filing. The secured creditor
may also believe that it will benefit by the forbearance. Other times, the secured creditor believes that the debtor will not succeed and that
foreclosure or bankruptcy is inevitable. Thus, the
Types of waiver provisions
III.
essence of the workout agreement between the
debtor and the secured creditor is often that a
While most cases dealing with pre-banklater bankruptcy will not occur; if the debtor does ruptcy waivers deal with waivers of the protec292 9 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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tions of the automatic stay, the same general considerations may apply to other bankruptcy rights.
For example, it is not uncommon for a pre-bankruptcy workout agreement to contain restrictions
on the debtor's ability to use cash collateral (i.e.,
cash or cash equivalents in which another party,
such as a lender, has a lien or other interest) upon
a subsequent bankruptcy filing. Other possible
waiver provisions include, but are not limited to:
requirements regarding the provision of adequate
protection to the lender; the granting of superpriority status for failure of adequate protection;
acknowledgments as to the validity and perfection of the creditor's lien; a prohibition of the
surcharge against a creditor's collateral under 11
U.S.C. § 506(c); the shortening or waiving of
the debtor's exclusive time period to file a plan
of reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 1121; agreements regarding the assumption or rejection of
executory contracts; and agreements or acknowledgments as to nondischargeability of debt. Very
few cases have addressed pre-bankruptcy agreements involving these types of provision. However, it seems likely that the majority of courts
will not, per se, uphold agreements dealing with
such bankruptcy provisions. Most courts will,
therefore, look to the facts and circumstances
surrounding the pre-bankruptcy agreement and
acknowledgments in the pre-bankruptcy agreement as a basis for making findings in the later
bankruptcy case.
IV.

Practice issues regarding
automatic stay waivers
A.

General provisions

The courts have been divided on whether
waivers of the automatic stay are enforceable.
Although the rulings in this area appear to be
1996

decisions of law, it is apparent that the underlying facts are very important and provide the real
explanation for most of the rulings. Before discussing the specifics of these cases, a few preliminary observations are in order.
First, although waivers of the automatic
stay are sometimes treated as self-executing, it
would be a serious error for a secured creditor to
attempt to foreclose without an order of the bankruptcy court granting relief from the automatic
stay. All of the cited cases arise in the context of
a filed motion for relief from the stay. Moreover,
courts have several times over commented such
a motion is necessary.' To attempt to foreclose
without filing a relief from stay motion may very
well draw a sanction under § 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code4 or other applicable law. Given that
fact, a secured creditor who wants to obtain a
waiver and who does not want to appear overreaching should draft language in contemplation
of a hearing.
Second, nearly all of the decided cases,
particularly those that appear to enforce the
waiver, arise in the relief from automatic stay
context with a common fact pattern: a single asset case with little or no equity in the property. It
seems clear in many of these cases that in a prebankruptcy workout the secured creditor has
given substantial concession. Therefore, if a
bankruptcy case is filed and the stay remains in
place, the secured creditor has not received the
benefit of its bargain: the debtor after promising
not to resist the creditor at the end of the forbearance period and then reneged. In most cases,
the court has gone out of its way to make clear
that there is no equity in the property and that an
effort at reorganization would be hopeless. In
such cases it is probable that the real basis for
granting relief from the stay was the presence of
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sufficient other facts to constitute "cause" for
relief from the stay or that the case was filed in
bad faith, which in itself constitutes cause. In
these cases, the pre-bankruptcy agreement is essentially treated as additional evidence supporting a finding of "cause" or bad faith.'
Third, a distinction should be made between an outright waiver of a bankruptcy right,
such as the right to oppose a motion for relief
from the stay, and stipulations of fact that would
support a motion for relief from stay. For example, the debtor may agree that there is no equity in the property or that reorganization would
be hopeless, and the facts supporting these conclusions may be spelled out in detail. Such stipulations of fact are less likely to be treated as void.6
B.

Advisability - creditor's
standpoint

In the context of drafting a pre-bankruptcy workout agreement, there are two basic
types of waiver provisions. The first is a selfexecuting waiver. The second is a waiver coupled
with acknowledgments by a debtor of facts and
circumstances that, when presented as evidence
together with the waiver at a relief from stay
hearing, will provide grounds for the court to find
that relief from stay is appropriate (or that "cause"
exists). These acknowledgments will operate to
weaken the debtor's credibility at such a hearing
should the debtor decide to oppose the relief from
stay motion on a basis other than a dramatic
change in circumstances.
As noted below,7 even cases upholding
relief from stay waivers have done so under circumstances where "cause" or other grounds existed for the granting of relief from stay separate
and apart from the waiver itself.Admissions con-
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cerning factual circumstances are likely to carry
more weight than self-executing waivers.A court
willing to recognize the futility of the debtor's
reorganization effort at a relief from stay hearing may be less willing to enforce a pre-bankruptcy self-executing waiver of the debtor's
rights without also considering whether there is
independent cause for granting relief from stay
(that is, whether bad faith exists, whether the
debtor in fact has a realistic possibility of reorganizing, whether the bankruptcy was initiated
only to delay foreclosure). Thus, the secured
creditor should present as a basis for stay relief
not only the waiver in the prepetition workout,
but also the debtor's acknowledgment as to factual matters that would give rise to a finding that
relief from stay is appropriate.
1. Enforcing the waiver
Although the cases enforcing the waiver
appear to be based on law, the finding of relief
from stay in these cases is actually based on the
totality of the facts. The leading case finding in
favor of a relief from stay waiver is In re Citadel
Properties.8 In Citadel, the secured creditor
agreed to a forbearance on its real estate foreclosure in exchange for an agreement that it would
be entitled to immediate relief from stay should
the debtor file a bankruptcy case. Following several earlier decisions,9 the court in Citadel followed the provisions in the prepetition agreement. 0
Another leading case "enforcing" a relief from stay waiver is In re Club Tower, LP.I
In Club Tower,the bankruptcy court upheld a provision in a forbearance agreement that entitled
the secured creditor to immediate relief from the
automatic stay. The court distinguished an agree-
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ment waiving the benefits of the automatic stay
from an absolute waiver of the debtor's right to
file bankruptcy, which the court indicated would
not be enforceable.
A third case supporting the secured creditor is In re Orange ParkSouth Partnership.2 In
OrangePark,the debtor entered into a prepetition
stipulation in a foreclosure action. The stipulation waived the debtor's defenses to the claim of
the mortgagee, conceded that there was no equity in the property encumbered by the mortgage,
and agreed that any subsequent bankruptcy filing by the debtor or a related partnership to whom
the debtor deeded the real property would be admitted to be totally unfounded and filed solely
for purposes of delay. After entering into the
stipulation, a new partnership was created, the
debtor delivered to it a deed for the real property, and the new partnership filed a chapter 11
bankruptcy case. The court found that the case
presented many of the factors typically present
in chapter 11 cases which are not filed in good
faith. The court found particularly egregious the
fact that the principals of the debtor had signed
prepetition stipulations admitting the case was
filed in bad faith. The court did not find any evidence that the prepetition stipulation was obtained either by coercion, fraud, or mutual mistake, and, thus, upheld the stipulation. Orange
Park is particularly noteworthy for upholding
prepetition acknowledgments (as opposed to
waivers of rights) and further, for upholding the
prepetition stipulation not of the newly created
partnership debtor, but of its predecessor in interest.
The Club Tower case was more recently
followed in In re Cheeks.I3 In Cheeks, the court
addressed the issue as to whether to enforce a
prepetition agreement by an individual debtor in
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a chapter 13 not to oppose a relief-from-stay
motion. The court, in upholding the waiver, found
that there was no basis to limit the enforceability
of relief-from-stay waivers to single-asset real
estate cases or for providing more or less relief
to particular classes of debtors. 4 Additionally,
in In re Powers, the court held that relief-fromstay waivers are not per se invalid, but are not
self-executing. 5 The court used a cause analysis
and determined that an evidentiary hearing would
be necessary. In In re Wheaton Oaks Office Partners, the bankruptcy court relied upon Citadel
Properties,Inc. and Club Tower, and held that a
prepetition court-approved contract waiving
post-petition defenses is cause for relief from the
automatic stay.'6
One court that has followed the foregoing line of cases in enforcing a prepetition waiver,
also imposed sanctions.In In re McBride Estate,
the debtor's confirmed chapter 11 reorganization
plan contained a provision consenting to relief
from the automatic stay if the general partner of
the debtor later filed bankruptcy. '7Thereafter, the
general partner filed his own chapter 11 case.
Rather than stipulating to relief from the automatic stay, the debtor resisted a motion for relief
brought by the secured creditor. The bankruptcy
judge found that the agreement entered into in
the partnership debtor's chapter 11 case was sufficient grounds for granting relief from the stay.
On a subsequent motion, the court imposed sanctions in excess of $4,000 on the debtor and his
attorney under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 8 for opposing the secured creditor's motion for relief.
The court agreed that a "radical new development" would have been an appropriate reason to
oppose the motion for relief, but found that no
such facts were presented and that the debtor had
"failed to present a workable basis for relieving
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it of the obligations set forth in its previous agreement."19
2. Negative factors for
creditors
Before including relief from stay waivin
workout
agreements, the secured creditor
ers
should consider the potential negative consequences. Of primary concern is the impression
that may be created on the bankruptcy court that
the secured creditor has been overreaching in
insisting on the inclusion of such a provision.
Such a negative impression may taint the court's
view of the creditor throughout the case. The
secured creditor should weigh the potential negative impression, especially where the other factual bases are not strong, and a good chance that
the court will not grant relief from the stay even
with a waiver in the agreement is evident. Along
these same lines, where a bankruptcy court has
found a creditor to be overreaching based on a
pre-bankruptcy waiver agreement, the lender
may find itself subject to liability, and its claim
may even be equitably subordinated.2"
Similarly, an acknowledgment of certain
facts, for example, the value of property or financial status of the business may set a benchmark for the bankruptcy court to later determine
that a material change in circumstances occurred.
Such incidents mitigates against the very relief
from stay the creditor is seeking. A change of
circumstances may, therefore, be used as a basis
for not enforcing such waivers or otherwise giving relief to a debtor from an agreement or court
order.
Finally, to obtain inclusion of waiver provisions, the secured creditor may have to use
bargaining chips unnecessarily. In light of issues
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regarding the enforceability of such provisions,
a secured creditor may not want to give up more
valuable benefits in a workout agreement in return for a waiver of questionable value. Thus,
inclusion of waivers must be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
C. Advisability - debtor's
standpoint
As discussed earlier in the scenario, counsel for the debtor should advise careful examination prior to signing a pre-bankruptcy waiver.
Often, a debtor has little, if any, leverage in negotiating workout agreements. Secured creditors
are increasingly insisting upon the inclusion of
waivers as a prerequisite to entering into any
workout agreement. From the debtor's standpoint, agreeing to pre-bankruptcy waiver provisions creates a number of issues. Although such
provisions may not be considered per se enforceable by most courts, a debtor should consider that
such provisions may have, at least, a substantially adverse affect the prospect of successfully
defending a motion for relief from the stay. As a
result, a debtor should strongly weigh the benefits it receives by virtue of the pre-bankruptcy
workout agreement against the potential loss of
the protection of bankruptcy rights.
In addition, individuals who owe fiduciary duties to the debtor should be careful if the
same agreement that waives valuable bankruptcy
rights also contains benefits for them personally.
Limited partners or minority shareholders may
argue in such a case that those in control breached
fiduciary duties or acted outside of the range of
reasonableness in consenting to a waiver.
There is also a risk that an unsecured
creditor will argue that a trustee should be ap-
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pointed because by conceding to a waiver or not
opposing the motion for relief, the debtor has
failed to act as an appropriate representative of
the bankruptcy estate. The unsecured creditor
may also argue that a trustee should not be bound
by the waiver.
Finally, both the debtor and the debtor's
counsel should consider if the need later arises
to defend a motion to stay relief, counsel who
participated in the negotiations may be in the
difficult position of having to argue against its
enforceability. It may be advisable to substitute
new counsel to handle the bankruptcy case. On
the other hand, it may be that the only real chance
for the debtor to even attempt to reorganize or
restructure debts is the workout agreement with
its creditor. Lastly, it may be apparent that in the
totality of the circumstances, more can be gained
in other parts of the negotiation if there is a concession on the waiver point. The decision is a
judgment call based on the specific facts and circumstances.
1. Refusing to enforce
waiver
If the debtor has signed a waiver, courts
have, under certain circumstances, refused to
enforce these waivers. Until recently, the leading case denying the secured creditor the benefit
of a prepetition waiver was In re Sky Group In-

tern., Inc.2" In this case, the bankruptcy court
refused to uphold a provision in a prepetition
agreement to the effect that in the event of bankruptcy, the debtor "hereby consents to relief from
the automatic stay

. . .

to allow [the lender] to

exercise its rights and remedies with respect to
the property.22 The court based its refusal to uphold the debtor's prepetition waiver of the auto-
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matic stay on the legislative history and public
policy behind Section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code.23
More recently, in Farm Credit of CentralFla.,24 the District Court for the Middle Dis-

trict of Florida declined to follow Citadel and
refused to enforce a provision in which the debtor
agreed not to contest a motion for relief from the
stay in the event the debtor filed for bankruptcy
protection. The provision was contained in a
stipulation approved by a state court that extended the date of a foreclosure sale. The bankruptcy judge concluded that the agreement "was
not in and of itself sufficient to lift the stay unless there is a showing of other criteria such as
bad faith. ' 25 The district court upheld the bankruptcy court and noted that the facts of the case
differed from earlier cases in which courts had
expressly or implicitly determined that the debtor
could not effectively reorganize. The debtor had
a long history of operating businesses, had significant other creditors, and had already filed a
plan or reorganization. This district court concluded:
It is the opinion of this Court that the Bankruptcy Court's holding that prepetition
agreements providing for the lifting of the
stay are "not per se binding on the debtor,
as a public policy position," is consistent
with the purposes of the automatic stay to
protect the debtor's assets, provide temporary relief from creditors and promote
equality of distribution among the creditors
by forestalling a race to the courthouse.
GATX Aircraft Corp. v. M/V Courtney

Leigh, 768 F2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1985).
The automatic stay provision is intended to
preclude the opportunity of one bankruptcy
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creditor to pursue a remedy against the
debtor to the disadvantage of other bankruptcy creditors and thus, to promote the
orderly administration of the bankrupt's
estate. Triangle Management Servs. v.
Allstate Say. & Loan Assoc., 21 B.R. 699
(N.D. Cal. 1932). No other creditors were
involved in the prepetition agreement, not
did the Bankruptcy Court approve this
agreement. The policy behind the automatic
stay is to protect the debtor's estate from
being depleted by creditors' lawsuits and
seizures of property before the debtor has
had a chance to marshal the estate's assets
and distribute them equitably among creditors. Martin-Trigonav. Champion Federal
Sav. & Loan Assoc., 892 F.2d 575 (7th Cir.
1989). The Bankruptcy Court correctly determined that the agreement to waive the
automatic stay was not self-executing.
Since even those cases that have enforced
the waiver did so after considering the facts of
the case, the view expressed in Farm Credit of
Central Fla., which explicitly adopts a middle
position, making the stay waiver agreement one
of the factors to be considered by the court, may
become the predominant judicial position in this
area.
V.

Enforceability of waiver in serial
filing cases

One of the most difficult issues involving waiver enforceability arises in serial filing
cases, where a debtor has filed multiple bankruptcy cases, usually one right after another.
Occasionally, a bankruptcy court order or a stipulation approved by a bankruptcy judge contains
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a provision for relief from the stay in the first
bankruptcy case and then purports to provide for
relief from the stay in a later case. Courts have
struggled with this situation, which presents an
issue similar to enforcing a pre-bankruptcy
waiver agreement previously described. However, serial filing, the debtor is not entitled to
sympathy on the equities. Rarely are there underlying facts that would give courts inclination
to be protective of the debtor. For that reason,
courts have enforced stipulations entered in one
case in a succeeding case on the basis of res
judicata,although it is difficult to justify that reasoning in a later filing in which the facts are necessarily somewhat different.
Perhaps, the leading case in this area is
In re Franklin, in which the bankruptcy court in
the third of five serial bankruptcy filings upheld
an order entered by the bankruptcy court in the
second bankruptcy case granting prospective relief from the automatic stay in future bankruptcy
proceedings pursuant to a stipulation of the parties.26 The secured creditor had concluded a foreclosure sale three days after the third bankruptcy
petition was filed. The debtors attempted to set
aside the foreclosure sale, arguing that it was
prohibited by the automatic stay that arose in the
third bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court,
upholding the order entered in the second case,
held that the automatic stay was not effective in
the third bankruptcy case and the sale was valid.
The debtors appealed on the grounds that the
bankruptcy judge in the second bankruptcy case
had no jurisdiction to lift the automatic stay in
future filings by means of a stipulated agreement
or order. The district court and Ninth Circuit both
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that the
previous bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to
approve the stipulation and that the stipulation
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removed the property from any automatic stay
in future filings.
In a later case in the Ninth Circuit, the
court reached the same result. In In re Spring
ParkAssocs., the debtors filed a chapter 12 case
in which they executed a stipulation regarding
refinancing of certain debts. 2 The stipulation
provided that the automatic stay was terminated
and a waiting period was established before a
foreclose date could be set and advertised. The
debtors' chapter 12 case was voluntarily dismissed, but the refinancing never materialized
and the debtors filed a second chapter 12 petition, seeking to invoke the automatic stay. The
creditor, a party to the stipulation approved in
the first chapter 12 case, sought relief from the
automatic stay. The bankruptcy court held that
the parties were bound by the stipulation approved in the previous bankruptcy case, stating
that "irreparable harm" would be caused to creditors and to the judicial process if the stipulation
was not enforced. The bankruptcy court's order
was affirmed by the district court and by the
Ninth Circuit.
Another case that has extensively discussed this issue is In re Abdul-Hasan.28 Noting
the Ninth Circuit decision in In re Franklin,discussed earlier, the bankruptcy court for the Central District of California enforced the provisions
in an order for relief from stay granted in a prior
chapter 13 case and ruled that the prospective
relief set forth in the prior order remained in effect in a subsequent bankruptcy case. The court
further held that the prior relief granted removed
any requirement that the creditor seek relief from
the automatic stay in a subsequent filing. The
debtor was collaterally estopped from attacking
the previous order granting prospective relief.
Further, the debtor was prevented from attach1996

ing the prior order by res judicata.The prior order was binding in a subsequent action involving the same parties and the same issues. The
court rejected the debtor's argument that the issues presented were different because of a change
in circumstances. Afterwards, at the time of the
subsequent filing, the debtor could have sought
a temporary restraining order and injunction under Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code to extend the automatic stay to the secured creditor.
The court also noted that while it would have
been "more comfortable" if the original order had
a six-to-twelve-month time limit, the eighteen
months that had passed between the entry of the
original order and the filing of the subsequent
case presented no issues of estoppel or latches
that would prevent enforcement of the prospective order.2 9

On the other hand, at least one court, in
the case of In re Taras, held that a bankruptcy
court has no authority to grant prospective relief
from stay.30 The court, quoting In re Norris,3
stated:
It is to be noted that there is nothing in the
statutory language ..

.

which purports to

enable the Bankruptcy Court to provide relief from the automatic stay in advance of
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. That is,
on its face, the statute makes the automatic
in all bankruptcy proceedings. In my view,
a bankruptcy judge in a pending proceeding simply does not have the power to determine that the automatic stay shall not
available in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings.32
The court did give res judicata effect to
that portion of an order from an earlier bank-
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ruptcy case that dealt with bifurcation of the
mortgagee's claim.
VI.

Enforceability of other provisions

these agreements did not meet the requirements
of Section 524(c). 37
As in the relief from stay situation, stipulations of fact have a much better chance of being enforced in the nondischargeability context
than mere waivers.A good example is illustrated
by In re Hart.38 In Hart, the debtor executed a
stipulation in a state court divorce action that
included a provision that certain attorneys' fees
were in the nature of support. In the subsequent
bankruptcy case, the court stated that "[a]lthough
the [d]efendant cannot contract away his right to
discharge fees in a subsequent bankruptcy, the
[d]efendant may stipulate [to] the underlying
facts that the [c]ourt must examine to determine
if the fees are dischargeable."39 In other words,
while a statement in a divorce decree cannot operate as a pre-bankruptcy waiver of the right to
have nondischargeability issues decided in an
adversary proceeding, the statement contained
in a stipulation or consensual order can be given
collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent
dischargeability action.

In addition to relief from stay waivers,
creditors may seek waivers of other debtor bankruptcy rights in pre-bankruptcy agreements. One
of these provisions includes a waiver of the
debtor's right to receive a discharge from its debt
to the creditor.
Courts have been consistent in not enforcing a waiver of the right to discharge. The
leading case in this context is In re Levinson.33
In a decision ultimately affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit, the bankruptcy court for the Northern
District of Illinois refused to give weight to a
state court consent order in which the debtor had
agreed that his debt would not be discharged in a
subsequent bankruptcy case. The court focused
on public policy considerations in holding that a
debtor may not contract away the right to a bankruptcy discharge. The court further found that
there was no effective waiver of discharge under
Section 727(a)( 10), or effective reaffirmation of VII.
a single debt under Section 524(c). 34 1n re

Levinson has been cited with approval in In re
McClure and In

35
re DePiero.

Courts have used

the same reasoning in refusing to enforce
prepetition stipulations purporting to be reaffirmation agreements.3 6 The courts have found that

E

N

D

N

before insisting on or agreeing to such provisions.
E.g., In re Citadel Properties, Inc., 86 B.R. 275 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1988); In re ClubTower, L.P., 138 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1991).
2
See II U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). Upon commencement of a bank-
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Conclusion

Despite the apparent lack of any per se enforceability relief from stay, waivers are becoming more commonplace in pre-bankruptcy workout agreements. Both creditors and debtors
should carefully review all of the circumstances

0

T

E

S

ruptcy case, an "automatic stay" arises and acts as an injunction against most actions by creditors against a debtor and its
assets. The primary purpose of the automatic stay is to give
the debtor a "breathing spell" from creditor actions.
'See II U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994).
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II U.S.C. § 362(h) (1984) provides that: "An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover
punitive damages." Some courts have held that sanctions
under this section are only available to individual debtors.
See, e.g., In re Goodman, 991 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1993). Even
so, other sanctions may still be available.
'In fact, none of the reported decisions appears to support the
proposition that a waiver will be enforced per se.
6
See infra "Enforceability of Other Provisions".
4

7

See infra "Enforcing the Waiver".
186 B.R. 275 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
9

The court cited with approval In re International Supply Corp.
of Tampa, Inc., 72 B.R. 510 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re
BOSS Partners 1, 37 B.R. 348 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); and
upheld In re Gulf Beach Dev. Corp. 48 B.R. 40 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1985). In Gulf Beach Dev. Corp., the court upheld the
terms of a prepetition agreement in which the debtor received
a foreclosure forbearance in exchange for agreeing that the
mortgagee would be entitled to immediate relief from the
automatic stay should the debtor file for protection under the
Bankruptcy Code.
"'In re Citadel Properties, Inc., 86 B.R. at 276-277.
"138 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
1279 B.R. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987).
'a167 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1994).
4

Id. at 819. The court also noted that the automatic stay will not
be lifted in all cases where a waiver exists; the court simply
will not give weight to the debtor's objection. The court will
still consider the objections of third parties. The court also
found that a relief-from-stay waiver is not self-executing and
must be enforced by motion.
11 170 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
16 In re Wheaton Oaks Office Partners, [1992 US Dist. LEXIS
18781 ] (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1992). See also In re Hudson Manor
Partners, Ltd., 28 C.B.C.2d 221 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 199 1) (following the Citadel and Orange Park cases).
B.R. 339 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1993).
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 is very similar to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and requires signing of
pleadings and other papers as certification that the assertion
is grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument and authorizes sanctions for violation of the
Rule.

'1154

8

9

1n re McBride at 342. The Powers court specifically disagreed
with the sanction aspect of McBride (the debtor may contest
the motion to lift the stay). Id. at 484.

20
See II U.S.C. §510 (1994)
2 108 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987).
22

1d. at 88.
23The court stated:

1996

The legislative history makes it clear that the automatic stay has
a dual purpose of protecting thedebtor and all creditors alike:
It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops
all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure action. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy. The automatic stay also
provides creditors protection. Without it, certain creditors
would be able to pursue their own remedies against the
debtor's property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of
other credits. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly
liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated
equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that. (Emphasis added).
To grant a creditor relief from stay simply because the debtor
elected to waive the protection afforded the debtor by the
automatic stay ignores the fact that it also is designed to protect all creditors and to treat them equally. The orderly liquidation procedure contemplated by the Code would be placed
in jeopardy, especially where (as here) none of the creditors
who brought the involuntary petition was a party to theAgreement in which debtor allegedly waives its right to the automatic stay.
Although waiver of a stay by the debtor apparently was possible
under the old Bankruptcy Act, such a waiver is not self-executing under the Bankruptcy Code. Relief from stay must
be authorized by the Bankruptcy Court.
Id. at 88-89 (emphasis in original).
24
Farm Credit of Central Fla., 160 B.R. 870 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
2
11d. at 873.
26802

27623

104 B.R. 263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).

21

29

F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1986).
F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1988).

See also In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994),
where the waiver was in a court-approved agreement in a
previous case.

3o136 B.R. 941 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992).
3139 B.R. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
32
33

1n re Taras, 136 B.R. at 948.
1n re Levinson, 58 B.R. 832 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1986), aff'd, 66
B.R. 548 (N.D. III. 1986), aff'd, 831 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1987).

3'See II U.S.C. §§ 524, 727 (1984).
3
1 n re McClure, 70 B.R. 955 (S.D. Cal. 1987); In
re DiPiero, 69
B.R. 279 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987). See also In re Markizer, 66
B.R. 1018 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) and In re Giambetti, 27
B.R. 492 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
'See II U.S.C. § 52(c) (1984).
3711 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1984) provides:
An agreement between a holder of a claim and the
debtor, the consideration for which, in whole or part, is based
on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title is
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that such agreement-

enforceable only to any extent enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is
waived, only if-

(A) represents fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor; and
(B) does not imposed an undue hardship on the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor;

(1) such agreement was made before the granting of
the discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this
title;
(2) (A) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement which advises the debtor that the agreement
may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within
sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by giving notice of recision to the holder of
such claim;
(B) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement which advises the debtor that such agreement
is not required under the title, under bankruptcy law, or under
any agreement not in accordance with the provisions of this
subsection;
(C) the attorney fully advised the debtor of the legal effect and consequences of (i) an agreement of the kind
specified in this subsection; and (ii) any default under such
an agreement;
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and,
if applicable, accompanied by a declaration or an affidavit of
the attorney that represented the debtor during the course of
negotiating an agreement under this subsection, which states
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(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any
time prior to discharge or within sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by giving
notice of recision to the holder of such claim;
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have
been complied with; and
(6)(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not
represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating
an agreement under his subsection, the court approves such
agreement as (i) not imposing an undue hardship on the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent
that such debt is a consumer debt secured by real property.
"In re Hart, 130 B.R. 817 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991).
39

1d. at 847-48.
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